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Recently there has been a considerable amount of pressure to accelerate 
consumer access to generic drugs, which are significantly less expensive 
than their brand-name counterparts.  One way to bring generic drugs on to 
the market sooner is through revision of the existing law relating to 
pharmaceutical patents. This iBrief describes recent regulatory changes to 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Hatch-
Waxman Act), which governs the patenting process for new drug products, 
as well as current legislative efforts to speed generic access through Hatch-
Waxman reform.  This iBrief also assesses whether these changes will be 
beneficial to consumers on a long-term basis. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Current Landscape of Pharmaceutical Patent Law 
¶1 While the debate over access to generic drugs has peaked in recent years, the topic has long been of 
concern to pharmaceutical companies, consumers, and legislators.  Innovating pharmaceutical companies 
have historically sought rigid patent protection due to the unique circumstances surrounding drug 
development.  Unlike other products, new pharmaceuticals must undergo rigorous testing and several phases 
of clinical trials before they reach the market, which creates significant research and development costs.  In 
fact, recent studies estimate that the cost of bringing a new drug to market is nearly $800 million.2  
Furthermore, while the full patent term in the United States is 20 years, patents on drug products are usually 
conferred very early in the development process, many years before the company completes the clinical trials 
necessary to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  Thus, the period of market 
exclusivity that the company enjoys following FDA approval may be significantly less than 20 years.  This 
period, known as the “effective patent life,” averaged only between 11 to 12 years for new medicines 
introduced in the early to mid-1990s.3  In order to compensate for reduced effective patent life, and the 
substantial costs incurred in research and development and clinical trials, pharmaceutical companies charge 
high prices for their patented drugs, often placing them out of the affordable reach of many consumers. In 
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1990, the average cost per prescription for brand-name medications was $27.16, and by 2000 it had nearly 
tripled to $65.29.4 
¶2 Due to the skyrocketing costs of prescription drugs, consumers have long argued that they should be 
allowed greater access to generic alternatives, which can be obtained at more reasonable prices.  The average 
cost per prescription for generic drugs in 2000 was only $19.33, nearly $50 less than the average for brand-
name medications.5  However, until the early 1980s, manufacturers wishing to develop generic counterparts to 
patented drugs had no choice but to wait for the original patents to expire before they could begin the 
application process to obtain FDA approval, which significantly delayed the market entry of generic drugs.6   
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
(the "Hatch-Waxman Act"), in 1984.7  The Hatch-Waxman Act, which amended the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act8, established a “regulatory framework designed to balance incentives for continued innovation 
among research-based pharmaceutical companies with opportunities for market entry by generic drug 
manufacturers.”9  Under Hatch-Waxman, generic manufacturers may now seek FDA approval to market the 
generic drug before the expiration of the patent of the branded product, via the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) Process.10 
¶3 Under the ANDA provisions, generic manufacturers are not required to repeat clinical trials 
performed by the innovator or conduct research on ingredients or dosage forms that have already been 
approved for safety and effectiveness.  Instead, the generic manufacturer need only establish that the generic 
drug is the bioequivalent of the brand name drug.  In other words, it must meet the same standards for 
strength, quality, purity, and identity as the branded product.11  Thus, if a generic manufacturer establishes 
bioequivalence and obtains FDA approval, the generic product may be made available to patients the day the 
innovator’s patent expires.12  
¶4 However, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows pioneer manufacturers a way to delay FDA approval of the 
generic alternative.  To begin the FDA approval process as specified under the ANDA provisions, a generic 
applicant must do two things:  (1) certify in its ANDA that the patent in question is invalid or is not infringed 
by the generic product (known as “paragraph IV certification”) and (2) notify the patent holder of the 
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submission of the ANDA.13  Once the patent holder receives the ANDA notification, they have 45 days to file 
a patent infringement suit against the generic applicant.14  If an infringement suit is filed within the 45-day 
period, FDA approval to market the generic version is automatically postponed for 30 months.15  The 30-
month stay is intended to allow time for the patent holder to litigate the infringement suit.16  These stays are 
extremely advantageous to innovating companies, because they provide over 2 years of additional market 
exclusivity, during which the derived profits from the patented drug far outweigh any incurred litigation 
costs.17  
Extending the Extensions:  Alleged Abuse of the 30-month Stay Provision 
¶5 Once pharmaceutical companies began to realize the advantageous nature of the 30-month stays, they 
also began looking for ways to extend them beyond the intended 30-month period.  According to a recent 
study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission, one of the most common ways that patent-holding 
companies are able to further delay the market entry of generic drugs is through multiple patent listings in the 
Orange Book, which is the FDA’s official listing of all approved products.18  The FTC study identified several 
instances in which brand-name companies listed related patents in the Orange Book after an ANDA had 
already been filed by a generic manufacturer.19   The effect of these “later-listings” is that the generic 
applicant is then required to re-certify that the later-listed patent is also invalid or not infringed and notify the 
patent holder of the re-certification.20  In essence, the generic applicant is required to repeat the ANDA 
process for the later-listed patent.  Furthermore, if upon notice of the generic manufacturer’s re-certification, 
the brand-name company sues for infringement within 45 days, then a new 30-month stay will begin to run, 
during which the FDA is prohibited from approving the original ANDA.21  According to the FTC, between 
1992 and 2000 there were 8 instances in which brand-name companies listed patents in the Orange Book after 
an ANDA was filed; for these 8 drug products, the additional delay of FDA approval caused by the additional 
30-month stay (beyond the original 30-month stay) ranged from 4 to 40 months.22  The following list shows 
the total length of stays issued for each of the 8 drug products, and the net sales gained from the drug during 
the extended period of market exclusivity:23 
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• Platinol:  number of stays: 1; length of stays (total): 30 months; net sales in year second 
stay was issued: between $100 and $250 million. 
• Hytrin (tablets):  number of stays: 3; length of stays (total): 70 months; net sales in year 
second stay was issued: between $500 and $750 million. 
• Paxil:  number of stays: 5; length of stays (total): 65 months; net sales in year second 
stay was issued: over $1 billion. 
• Taxol:  number of stays: 2; length of stays (total): up to 60 months (the actual length of 
the stays was shortened due to court actions);24 net sales in year second stay was issued: 
between $0.75 and $1 billion. 
• BuSpar:  number of stays: 2; length of stays (total): up to 30 months (the actual length of 
the stays was shortened due to court actions);25 net sales in year second stay was issued: 
between $500 and $750 million. 
• Neurontin (capsules):  number of stays: 2; length of stays (total): 53 months; net sales in 
year second stay was issued: between $250 and $500 million. 
• Neurontin (tablets):  number of stays: 2; length of stays (total): 37 months; net sales in 
year second stay was issued: between $250 and $500 million. 
• Tiazac:  number of stays: 2; length of stays (total): up to 60 months (the actual length of 
the stays was shortened due to court actions);26 net sales in year second stay was issued: 
between $100 and $250 million. 
¶6 One reason that these “later-listings" have been attacked is because it is unclear whether many of 
these patents meet the FDA’s requirements for listing in the Orange Book.  The FDA’s listing regulation 
requires that additional patents listed in the Orange Book must either “claim the approved drug product” or 
claim a new use of the approved product.27  The specific categories of patents that may be listed in the Orange 
Book include drug substance patents, drug formulation patents, and method of use patents.  Thus, almost all 
changes to a drug’s formulation or labeling (which indicates all approved uses of the product) require 
additional FDA approval and are properly listed in the Orange Book.28  However, it is unclear whether certain 
types of patents meet the FDA criteria, specifically metabolite patents, polymorph patents, drug intermediate 
patents, product-by-process patents, and patents for unapproved uses. 
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• Metabolite Patents.  According to the FTC, there are at least two instances in which 
brand-name companies have listed and sued generic companies for infringement of 
metabolite patents.29  A metabolite is a chemical compound created when the patient’s 
body metabolizes the active ingredient of a drug product.30  Thus, a generic applicant 
cannot directly infringe upon a metabolite patent, but patent holders contend that the 
generic applicant will contribute to infringement by selling the drug to patients who will 
metabolize it.31  At least one district court has held that a brand-name company may not 
list a metabolite patent in the Orange Book, because it does not “claim the approved 
product” as required by the FDA listing regulations.32 
• Polymorph Patents.  Polymorph patents claim a chemical compound that differs from 
the active ingredient by water-of-hydration or that forms a crystalline structure different 
from the active ingredient already approved by the FDA.33  Typically, the FDA grants 
approval for a brand-name company to sell only one polymorph of an active ingredient 
in a single application.34  Given this fact, many argue that polymorphs are not part of the 
approved drug product, and therefore additional patents for polymorphs do not claim the 
approved product and thus may not be listed in the Orange Book.35  However, the FDA 
will approve polymorphic generic formulations as bioequivalents of the patented drug, 
and thus it can be argued that polymorphs do claim the same active ingredient and 
should be listed.36  In one such instance, a district court upheld the listing of a polymorph 
for the hypertension medication, Hytrin.37 
• Drug Intermediate Patents.  An intermediate patent claims a chemical compound that is 
used during the production of an active ingredient, but is not present in the final, 
marketed form of the drug product.38  It is argued that patents for such intermediates also 
do not “claim the approved drug product” as required by the listing regulations.  
However, a district court did hold that an intermediate of the cancer drug, Aredia, could 
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be listed in the Orange Book, but the court based its decision on a finding that the 
claimed compound was a “component” of Aredia and did not address whether the 
intermediate compound “claimed the approved drug product.” 39 
• Product- by-Process Patents.    Product-by-process patents are essentially a hybrid of a 
product patent and a process patent; they claim a drug product that is produced by a 
specified process.40   There are two main arguments supporting a prohibition on the 
listing of these patents in the Orange Book.  First, product-by-process patents do not 
comprise a category of listable patents under the FDA’s listing regulations (only drug 
substance, formulation, and method of use patents are included).41  Second, the listing 
regulations explicitly prohibit the listing of process patents, and product-by-process 
patents are arguably more similar to process patents than product patents due to the fact 
that the scope of coverage afforded by a product-by-process patent is almost identical to 
that afforded by a process patent.42 
• Patents for Unapproved Uses.  While the above types of patents concern drug substance 
and formulation, there are also some uncertainties regarding which types of patents may 
be listed which claim a method of use.  It is unclear whether patents which claim only 
unapproved uses of the drug can be listed in the Orange Book.  For example, a patent 
listed for Neurontin claims the use of the drug to treat neurodegenerative diseases, 
although the FDA has only approved Neurontin for treating epilepsy, which is not a 
neurodegenerative disease.43  Many argue that allowing the listing of only approved uses 
is the only way to stop patent holder from claiming broad uses or indications not in the 
approved labeling.44  Several courts have held that an ANDA applicant does not need to 
re-certify to a patent claiming a use not approved in the original drug application.45 
Tightening the Loopholes:  How the New FDA Regulations Affect Orange Book Listings and 
the 30-Month Stay Provision 
¶7 Under the current system, there is no official mechanism to remove an improperly listed patent from 
the Orange Book.  The FDA itself does not have the resources to review the patents listed in the Orange 
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Book, and courts have ruled that generic applicants have no private right of action to challenge the listings.  
These arguments have historically been made in the course of infringement litigation, and the courts’ 
decisions in these cases have provided little guidance as to the types of patents (i.e. polymorph, metabolite, 
etc.) that may be listed.46  As a result, the FDA announced new regulations on June 12, 2003 which aim to 
resolve much of the uncertainty regarding the type of patents that may be listed and prevent unwarranted 
extensions of the 30-month stay.47  The new regulations, which go into effect on August 19, 2003 clarify the 
types of patents that may and may not be listed in the Orange Book: 
1. Any patents claiming metabolites, intermediates, or packaging features may not be 
submitted for listing in the Orange Book.48 
2. Polymorph patents may be submitted if they claim the same active ingredient as the 
approved product.  However, the applicant must now certify that they have test data 
demonstrating that a drug product containing the polymorph will perform the same as 
the original drug product, including demonstration of bioequivalence and comparative in 
vitro dissolution testing on the polymorph and the original drug product.49 
3. Product-by-process patents are listable in the Orange Book; however, new declaration 
forms require the applicant to certify that the patent being submitted is a product-by-
process patent in which the product claimed is novel, as opposed to the process being 
novel.  This certification is intended to eliminate the submission of patents that are 
actually process patents, which cannot be submitted for listing.50 
4. Patents on unapproved methods of use cannot be submitted.  Furthermore, patent 
information submitted claiming approved methods of use must identify each individual 
claim and the corresponding use or indication in the approved drug labeling.  The 
applicant must also publish this information under the “use code description” in the 
Orange Book.51 
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¶8 While the new regulations clarify which types of patents may or may not be listed, there remain many 
circumstances in which a patent holder may validly list a patent after a generic applicant has filed an ANDA, 
such as patents related to improved purity of the active ingredient, safer dosing regime, or new indications for 
which a drug was approved but the patent was not issued until after application approval.52  However, even if 
a patent holder does validly list a patent after the filing of a generic ANDA, the new regulations specify that 
no additional notice has to be provided by the applicant following re-certification to the later-listed patent.  
Thus, the patent holder has no opportunity to file a subsequent infringement suit, thereby invoking an 
additional 30-month stay.  The regulations, therefore, effectively limit the patent holder to one 30-month stay 
per ANDA.53 
¶9 The FDA estimates that the elimination of multiple 30-month stays per ANDA and earlier market 
entry by generic drugs will reduce consumer expenditures on pharmaceuticals by $2.040 billion per year.54  
The savings to generic manufacturers will also be substantial, since the number of litigations will be reduced 
due to the new regulations limiting each ANDA to one patent infringement suit.  Furthermore, clarification of 
the types of later-issued patents that may be submitted will increase the predictability of the generic drug 
entry process and reduce product introduction costs faced by generic drug firms.55 
Closing the Loopholes Even More:  Pending Legislation Regarding Access to Generics 
¶10 While the FDA regulations fix many of the existing problems with the Hatch-Waxman Act, many feel 
that the new rules are not an adequate solution, and that Congress should take further action regarding Hatch-
Waxman reform.  According to Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO of the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, “more measures outside of the FDA’s authority are necessary to ensure timely access.”56    In 
fact, the Senate has been addressing the issue of access to generic drugs since early 2002, when Senator John 
McCain introduced the Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act ("GAAP"), which proposed 
additional reforms to the Hatch-Waxman Act.  While the GAAP passed in the Senate by an overwhelming 
margin, the House of Representatives did not act on the bill.57  The issue was revived in 2003, when Senators 
Judd Gregg and Charles Schumer each introduced a new version of the GAAP, and a bipartisan compromise 
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was recently passed by the Senate (94-1) on June 19, 2003.58  The GAAP was also added as an amendment to 
the Prescription Drug & Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, which was passed by the Senate on June 26.59 
¶11 The GAAP60 includes several provisions which aim to further tighten loopholes in the Hatch-
Waxman Act and speed consumer access to generic drugs: 
Provisions Regarding the 30-Month Stay 
¶12 The GAAP, like the FDA regulations, is clear in its intent to allow only one 30-month stay will be 
allowed per ANDA.  However, one criticism of the regulations is that they allow brand name companies to 
seek stays on patents listed right up until the day before the generic drug is to enter the market, provided that 
the company did not already exhaust its opportunity for a 30-month stay by filing an infringement suit on the 
original patent certified by the generic ANDA.  Thus, by merely declining to file an infringement suit on its 
original patent, the patent-holding company can leave the door open for a later-listing, and an initiate a 30-
month stay which would delay market entry of the generic drug at the last possible moment.61 
¶13 By comparison, the GAAP would only allow a 30-month stay to be triggered when a brand-name 
company sues a generic applicant for infringement of a patent that was listed in the Orange Book before the 
ANDA was submitted to the FDA.62  As such, the 30-month stay would not be likely to cause a significant 
delay in the generic’s introduction to the marketplace, because the stay would run concurrent to the FDA’s 
consideration of the application, which usually takes 18-25 months.63 While this provision does significantly 
limit the number of patents that can trigger the 30-month stay, it is more permissive than the provision in last 
year’s GAAP, which only allowed a stay for patents that were already listed by a brand-name company at the 
time the drug product was approved by the FDA.  This year’s bill allows for stays on patents which are listed 
in the Orange Book following FDA approval, as long as they are listed prior to the generic applicant’s filing 
of the ANDA.64 
¶14 As an extra assurance to generic applicants, the GAAP also provides that if a brand-name company 
does not bring an infringement suit within 45 days of the generic applicant’s initial certification and notice, 
the generic applicant may seek a declaratory judgment stating that no patents are being violated.65  Thus the 
GAAP would provide generic drug companies with additional protection from potential abuses by pioneer 
manufacturers of the 30-month stay. 
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Provisions Regarding Orange Book Listings 
¶15 Unlike the FDA regulations, the GAAP does not specify which patents may or may not be listed in 
the Orange Book.  However, it does create a new mechanism for challenging improper Orange Book listings.  
If a name-brand company lists a questionable patent and sues a generic applicant for violating that patent in 
order to trigger the 30-month stay, the GAAP allows the generic company to file a counterclaim, arguing that 
the patent should not have been listed.Subsequently, an order may be entered requiring the patent owner to 
correct or delete the patent information from the Orange Book.66  This provides an official mechanism for 
unlisting improper patents from the Orange Book, one which previously did not exist under current law or 
FDA regulations. 
Provisions Regarding Generic Exclusivity 
¶16 Another provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act that has historically been subject to abuse by 
pharmaceutical companies but which was ignored by the FDA regulations is the 180-day exclusivity period 
granted to generic applicants.  Under Hatch-Waxman, the first generic company to submit a paragraph IV 
certified ANDA to the FDA has an exclusive right to market the generic drug for 180 days, during which the 
FDA may not approve a subsequent generic applicant’s ANDA.67 The 180-day exclusivity period was 
included in the Hatch-Waxman Act for the purpose of encouraging generic companies to invest in the 
required product testing and to submit to the expensive patent infringement suits that are filed against them.68  
However, this provision has been criticized because it creates incentive for name brand and generic 
companies to enter into anticompetitive agreements, under which a generic manufacturer may accept payment 
from a brand name company not to market the generic product, thereby blocking other generic manufacturers 
from entering the market.69  If the 180-day period of market exclusivity does not begin to run, then the FDA is 
prohibited from approving any subsequent eligible generic applicants indefinitely.70 
¶17 The FTC has identified three instances in which the Commission alleged that a brand-name drug 
company paid the first generic applicant not to enter the market, thereby precluding the FDA from approving 
subsequent applicants.71  Under the GAAP, if it were found that a generic drug company entered into an 
anticompetitive agreement with a brand company or otherwise failed to come to market in a timely manner, 
then the generic company would be required to forfeit its rights to exclusivity, and the 180-day period would 
be awarded to any other generic company ready to come to market.72 
Provisions Regarding Bioequivalence Testing 
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¶18 Generic drugs will not receive FDA approval unless they can show that they are the bioequivalent of 
the previously approved brand-name drug.  Typically, bioequivalence is determined by measuring the rate and 
absorption of the drug into the bloodstream.  However, for certain drugs which are not absorbed into the 
bloodstream, such as topical medications, the FDA uses different tests to determine bioequivalence.  In 
certain instances, brand-name companies have challenged these tests, and these challenges have led to the 
delay of approval of generic versions of these drugs.73  The GAAP clarifies that the FDA has the authority to 
establish separate tests for determining the bioequivalence of drugs which are not absorbed into the 
bloodstream, so long as those tests are scientifically valid.74  Thus the GAAP includes a number of safeguards 
against abusive tactics that are employed by pioneer manufacturers in order to skew the pharmaceutical 
market in their favor. 
Is Legislation Really Necessary? 
¶19 American consumers have a substantial economic interest in increased access to prescription 
medications at affordable prices.  According to the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"), the original 
version of the GAAP was estimated to save consumers $60 billion over the next ten years.75 It is also not 
surprising that prescription drugs prices have been under attack in Medicare reform legislation; the CBO 
predicts a 10% per year increase in Medicare beneficiaries’ drug costs during the next decade; expanded drug 
coverage for senior citizens will further increase spending.76 
¶20 However, it is probable that dollar figures alone will not determine what is ultimately in the best 
interest of consumers.  While consumers may realize economic benefits in the short term by gaining greater 
access to generic versions of drugs that are currently available, they may not realize the health benefits that 
would otherwise arise from the discovery of new drugs by research-based pharmaceutical companies.  By 
lessening patent protection and decreasing the period of exclusivity during which pharmaceutical companies 
may market drugs, profits decrease, and accordingly, so do companies’ incentives for further innovation.  
While many criticize pharmaceutical companies for setting a too-high profit margin, it is important to 
recognize that research and development costs are extremely high, notably in comparison to other industries.  
Recent studies estimate that the cost of bringing a new drug to market is nearly $800 million.77  This high cost 
is mostly due to the fact that for every 5,000 chemicals tested in animals, only five go on to human clinical 
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testing, and of this five, only one makes it to market.78  Thus, a pharmaceutical company must have the 
financial resources to develop and test thousands of compounds, knowing that very few of them will ever 
reach consumers or potentially reap a profit.  Due to this lottery-like effect, when a company latches on to a 
“winner,” they must gain enough profit from that drug to fuel the continuing research and development cycle.     
¶21 To what extent will the proposed changes in pharmaceutical patent protection affect research-based 
companies’ investment in research and development?  One fact is clear:  The number of new drug 
applications submitted by research-based firms is already declining.  In the mid-1990s, the FDA was 
approving approximately 120 new applications per year.79  In 2001, the FDA approved only 66 new drug 
applications.80  Industry analysts say that much of the decline is due to expanded pre-market test requirements 
imposed by the FDA, which often require companies to run more preclinical screening tests and clinical trials 
in order to obtain additional safety data.81  While most will agree that drug safety is an important concern, it is 
arguable whether changes in patent protection are called for at a time when the number of new drugs being 
made available to patients is already decreasing.   
¶22 At least one study has attempted to measure the cost to consumers of eliminating patent protection 
and accelerating generic entry in terms of the lost health benefits which would otherwise be gained from the 
development of new drugs.  The study made the following findings:82 
1. The long run effect of such generic entry on total revenues to branded pharmaceutical 
companies is a decline in revenues of 65%; 
2. A 65% decline in revenues leads to a 65% decline in research and development 
spending; 
3. A 65% decline in research and development spending leads to a 65% decline in new 
chemical entities; 
4. A 65% decline in new chemical entities leads to a reduced longevity of 1.6 million life 
years per year; 
5. The value of this longevity decline is $240 billion dollars per year. 
¶23 Using this analysis, the study concludes that consumers would lose roughly $3 in health benefits due 
to future innovation for every $1 gained due to easier access to generic drugs in the short-term.83  While the 
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study assumes the elimination of patent protection entirely, a similar analysis could be performed using the 
decline in revenues that would result from the proposed legislation, which would be less than 65%, but 
substantial nonetheless. 
¶24 Thus, if patent protection is decreased, there will be at least some losses to consumers resulting from 
lessened incentives for innovation among research-based pharmaceutical companies.  Consumers must decide 
if they are willing to exchange the potential for future development of new life-saving drugs for smaller bills 
at the pharmacy in the short-term.  Perhaps the FDA regulations and the GAAP strike the proper balance:  
both attempt to clarify the existing law and prevent abuse of the current system, without radically weakening 
the patent protection afforded to brand-name pharmaceutical companies.  However, they will both have the 
effect of decreasing an already-shortened effective patent life for a product that is extremely costly to develop.  
In order to compensate, pharmaceutical companies may raise prices even more for a drug that is first 
introduced, knowing that there is little they can do to delay generic entry on to the market. 
¶25 Clearly the debate will continue, and consumer groups and pharmaceutical companies will likely be 
tracking the GAAP very closely in the upcoming months.  Undoubtedly, much of the attention will be focused 
on consumer savings.  Hopefully, consumers will be able to look beyond the numbers and see the larger 
picture:  that waiting a little bit longer for a generic cholesterol medication may give a pharmaceutical 
company the resources it needs to discover a cure for heart disease ten years down the road.  
